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Abstract
Vietnam has been decentralizing nutrition planning to provinces, which could help with local rele-
vance and accountability. Assessment in 2009 found a continuing top-down approach, limited
human capacity, and difficulty in integrating multiple sectors. Alive and Thrive (A&T) provided tar-
geted assistance and capacity-building for 15 provincial plans for nutrition (PPNs). We aimed to (i)
assess PPN content and quality improvements 2009–2014, and (ii) explain processes through which
change occurred. Data consisted of interview-based assessments of provincial planning processes,
annual PPN assessments, and tracking of A&T involvement. At endline, some provinces produced
higher quality plans. Local planning skills improved, but capacity remained insufficient. Awareness
of and support for nutrition improved, but some policy and legal environments were contradictory.
Objectives were clearer, but use of data for planning remained inconsistent. Provinces became
more proactive and creative, but remained constrained by slow approval processes and insufficient
funding. Targeted assistance and local advocacy can improve decentralized planning, with success
dependent on policy and programming contexts and ability to overcome constraints around cap-
acity, investment, data use and remnants of centralized planning. We recommend strong engage-
ment with planners at the national level to understand how to unblock major constraints; solutions
must take into consideration the particular political, financial and administrative context.
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Key messages
• Targeted assistance and local advocacy can improve decentralized planning.
• Success is dependent on policy and programming contexts and ability to overcome constraints around capacity, invest-
ment and data use.
• A key issue is the degree to which centralized planning can be devolved; strong engagement is needed with planners at
national level to achieve this.
• Solutions must understand and consider the particular political, financial and administrative context in which decentral-
ized planning is being attempted.
VC The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 1
Health Policy and Planning, 2016, 1–9
doi: 10.1093/heapol/czw067
Original article
 Health Policy and Planning Advance Access published May 19, 2016
 at Queensland University of Technology Library on June 1, 2016
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Introduction
A broad theme of public administration in general, and of nutrition
for development in particular, is that centralization of power and re-
sources with national bodies limits program applicability and ac-
countability locally (Bryce et al. 2008). The solution proposed in an
increasing number of states is varying forms of decentralization,
transferring different types of power, to different extents, to differ-
ent forms of local authorities (Ahmad et al. 2005). Decentralization
theory holds that service quality can be improved through many and
diverse routes, including engagement of local citizens in decisions
(legitimacy); holding local leaders to account and reducing corrup-
tion (integrity and accountability); tailoring of services and use of re-
sources to local contexts (allocative efficiency); linking local
revenues to services (cost recovery); improvement of local capacity
(technical efficiency); service delivery innovation (quality); fairer dis-
tribution of resources (equity); and avoidance of delays due to cen-
tral decision making (Litvak et al. 1998; Azfar et al. 1999, 2001;
Bossert and Beauvais 2002). Empirical work has not uniformly
upheld the theory; however, noting failures of policy coordination
and failures due to inadequate capacity (Azfar et al. 2001); widening
of regional disparities and short-term service disruption (Azfar et al.
1999); and elite capture of local government and weak accountabil-
ity (Crook 2003) as outcomes of decentralization. This discrepancy
between empirical observations and what is posited by theory may
stem from imperfect theory or incomplete implementation or both,
but which is the likely explanation is little understood. Given the
possible positive and negative effects, the question for some becomes
not whether to decentralize, but how to do it best for a given issue in
a given context (Bossert and Beauvais 2002).
‘Decentralization’ refers to a range of localized governance ar-
rangements which transfer power from a central authority to lower
hierarchical levels, including ‘devolution’ (shifting decision-making
powers to lower levels of government), ‘deconcentration’ (shifting
responsibility or tasks but not decision-making power to geograph-
ically dispersed agents), and ‘delegation’ (shifting responsibility to
entities outside of full government control) (Bossert and Beauvais
2002); these terms are not used consistently (Yuliani 2004).
Decentralization takes three forms: administrative decentralization,
where decisions and authority over planning and implementation of
programs are delegated downwards; fiscal decentralization, where
the means to accumulate and/or spend public money are afforded to
local administrations; and political decentralization, whereby polit-
ical choices are also made at local levels (Riedl and Dickovick
2014).
Decentralization is often viewed by states as a loss of power,
both relinquishing central control and delegating power to sub-
national elements which do not necessarily support the central gov-
ernment (Gilson et al. 2006; Maluka et al. 2011). Some states tend
to choose decentralization as an administrative tool, and authoritar-
ian, hegemonic regimes without political alternation—particularly
those with strong sub-national footholds, a history of patronage of
loyal local leaders, and high territorial penetration of functionaries
with administrative capacity—are most likely to decentralize (Riedl
and Dickovick 2014). In Vietnam, attempts to decentralize started
in the late 1980s after the adoption of renovation (doi moi) (Nguyen
2008); the government has in recent years added decentralization of
nutrition planning to provinces in an attempt to improve local rele-
vance and accountability, in line with decentralization theory. In
general, Vietnamese policy statements support administrative and
fiscal decentralization to improve the effectiveness and transparency
of the government (Fritzen 2006). Vietnam’s decentralization,
however, faces two important challenges. First, bureaucratic actors
lack incentive to transfer power and resources to local levels.
Second, decentralization contributes to widening regional disparities
due to differences in capacities and resources of local governments
in rich and poor provinces (Fritzen 2006). Vietnam’s decentraliza-
tion of public services has been described as ‘deconcentration’ rather
than ‘devolution’, with the transfer of responsibility for specific
tasks and associated funds, but maintenance of centralized decision-
making power, targets, and plans (Wit 2007). Planning for nutrition
presents several challenges that relate to the overall process of de-
centralization in Vietnam (Lapping et al., 2014), the most serious
among them being planning that is top down and financially dir-
ected rather than localized and having a problem-solving focus, as
well as limited actor capacity for planning.
Reducing undernutrition lends itself to decentralized planning
because of its intersectoral and context-specific nature. The conver-
gence of multiple sectors and programs necessary for improved nu-
trition may be more feasible at local levels, and local combinations
of causes may be easier to identify than when planned centrally
(Harris and Drimie 2012). The Vietnamese government has had a
particular interest in human capital in its social development strat-
egy, and the National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) is seen as an insep-
arable part of the economic and social development strategy of the
country. To implement the NNS on a nationwide scale, the govern-
ment issued a decentralization policy to support the provinces in de-
veloping more effective plans for health and nutrition and respond
appropriately to the needs of their own communities. Because most
national programs for poverty alleviation and health promotion in
Vietnam are managed by provinces (Green and Dao 2005), the pro-
vincial level is considered best to enact change in these issues
(Lapping et al. 2007). Thus, improvements in provincial planning
have potential for significant nutrition program impacts in theory,
increasing local relevance, and the effectiveness of local plans. A nu-
trition plan that is well-justified, evidence-based, contextual and in-
volves inter-sectoral stakeholders is also more likely to be funded by
multiple sponsors, and such a plan can also lead to more efficient
use of resources and ensure that these resources are used to better
meet local needs, in theory resulting in narrowing disparities be-
tween rich and poor provinces.
In 2010 research was conducted to gain better understanding of
the process of developing provincial plans for nutrition (PPNs) from
different stakeholders in this process. The process of PPN develop-
ment, review and approval annually was found to be lengthy, start-
ing with activities undertaken at the national level, with
implementation of tasks at the lower levels directed by authorities at
the higher levels. Research conducted in seven provinces between
2009 and 2010 (Lapping et al. 2014) found that the effectiveness of
PPN development was constrained by a top-down planning ap-
proach, limited budget, limited data availability and quality, limited
staff experience or knowledge about process and finances for effect-
ive planning at sub-national levels, and difficulty in integrating ac-
tions from multiple sectors. Analysis of the PPN process at the
provincial level suggested that it was largely driven by fiscal con-
cerns, with little variation across administrative units; that is, the ad-
ministrative units obeyed their (centrally provided) instructions to
be best of their ability, based on prevailing resource and capacity
constraints. Additional constraints identified—top-down processes
and difficulty integrating sectors—were in large part due to broader
issues related to decentralization of power. Authors concluded that
transforming provincial planning from a top-down approach would
be slow, with a strategic multiyear approach needed to strengthen
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the planning process in provinces, and requiring addressing key bar-
riers identified through the research.
A consortium of implementers from Alive and Thrive (A&T),
knowing about and partly responding to these findings, provided
targeted assistance and capacity-building in 15 provinces of
Vietnam over the period 2009–14 in order to improve nutrition
planning. Health services research has found several conditions to
be critical for success in decentralizing health-services planning in
developing countries, including provision of adequate and appropri-
ate assistance to local entities, formulating clear goals, carefully
defining boundaries between functions controlled by central-level
managers and those controlled by their field-level counterparts, and
helping to build local-level capacity by providing technical and ma-
terial support to field staff (Omar 2002). These functions were taken
up in the A&T program (described in Box 1).
The objectives of this study were to: (i) assess the changes in pro-
vincial planning on nutrition, including PPN content and quality im-
provements 2009–14, in the provinces that received A&T support;
(ii) explain processes through which change to PPNs occurred, or
failed to occur; and (iii) assess the contribution of A&T support to
the changes in provincial planning on nutrition.
Methods
Data consisted of stakeholder interviews in 2010 and 2014, annual
PPN quality assessments from 2010 to 2014, and tracking of A&T
involvement from 2010 to 2014. These three data sources were
brought together in a narrative synthesis for final analysis. The study
received Institutional Review
Board approval from the authors institutes. Each of the partici-
pating provinces gave verbal consent to use the PPNs for content
analysis. Verbal consent for participating and having the interviews
tape-recorded were obtained for all interview participants, and the
endline interview research protocol was reviewed and approved by
the authors’ institutes.
Stakeholder interviews
Stakeholder interviews covered participants from different sectors
with roles in PPN such as development of nutrition plans, reviewing
and/or approving and implementation. Interviews focused on what
changed in provincial planning for nutrition, why changes hap-
pened, how A&T are perceived to have contributed to change, bar-
riers to change towards evidence-based planning, and ideas on
improving the effectiveness of PPN development and implementa-
tion. Seven of 15 provinces that received support from A&T were
selected for interviews, representing the three major geographic re-
gions in Vietnam (North, Central and South) and different situations
for infant and young child feeding (IYCF). For instance, early initi-
ation of breastfeeding is 33% in the North, 57% in the Central and
30% in the South regions. Exclusive breastfeeding is 15% in the
North, 38% in the Central and 7% in the South regions. Minimum
dietary diversity is 55% in the North and 37–40% in the Central
and South regions (MICS 2011). Forty-one interviews with a total
of 66 participants were conducted, including 26 interviews with an
individual respondent and 15 in-depth interviews with 2 or more
participants; group interviews were done when an invited partici-
pant requested that her or his staff members, who were involved in
nutrition planning, attend without prior notice to the research team.
Participants came from organizations in different sectors, each play-
ing a role in different steps of the PPN process; more than three
quarters of the participants were from health organizations.
NVivo 10 software was used to organize, code, and analyze all
interview data. An a priori approach was used to build the code list,
in which the codes and themes were established prior to data ana-
lysis based on the content and structure of the interview guide.
During the coding process, researchers wrote memos to record any
emerging patterns, key issues, recurrent themes and concepts, allow-
ing expanding and accommodation of emerging themes and sub-
themes. Through reflection and interpretation, data-derived findings
of common themes and patterns or relationships between categories
and their properties were summarized. Frequency of reference by re-
spondents was used to identify priority issues; contradictory per-
spectives, where they were found, were also highlighted in reporting
and discussing each theme.
Annual PPN quality assessments
To monitor changes in the quality of PPNs, analyses were conducted
annually to examine the elements of PPNs and the quality of those
elements in provinces supported by A&T, and to assess changes in
Box 1 Brief description of A&T and the goals of A&T’s work with respect to provincial planning
Alive & Thrive (A&T) is an initiative funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to reduce under nutrition and death
caused by sub-optimal and young child feeding practices in three countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Vietnam) for a 6-
year period (2009–14) (Baker et al. 2013). In Vietnam, A&T’s behavior change framework included four interrelated compo-
nents: advocacy, interpersonal communication and community mobilization, mass communication, and strategic use of
data. A&T Vietnam has been engaged in advocacy to improve the IYCF policy and regulatory environments for breastfeed-
ing and to strengthen provincial planning on nutrition.
At the central level, A&T worked closely with the National Institute of Nutrition (NIN) and the Department of Maternal and
Child Health Care to revise and develop the complex PPN preparation guidelines. A&T also supported NIN to prepare an-
nual provincial nutrition profiles which contain critical nutrition data that can be used for evidence-based planning, and
supported NIN financially (i.e. funding to organize provincial workshops) and technically (i.e. preparing presentations and
providing technical support at workshops) in hosting PPN workshops. In addition, two national workshops were organized
in 2010 and three in 2011 to review the implementation of the NNS 2001–10, disseminate strategies for 2011–15, guide the
development of the PPNs, and inform the budget for each province.
At the provincial level, the main advocacy activities included information gathering, various types of capacity building and
dissemination workshops, and hands-on support for preparing the PPNs. A&T staff worked closely with provincial partners
to provide technical support in planning workshops, such as helping with preparing agendas, presentations, and other
related materials. A&T staff was also closely involved in gathering evidence and information for the preparation of PPNs.
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the quality of PPNs from 2010 to 20141. A qualitative content ana-
lysis was employed to assess the quality of PPNs of fifteen
Vietnamese provinces including four Northern, five Central,and six
Southern provinces. The coding scheme, adapted from the coding
concepts, is a combination of a priori coding and emergent coding
(Stemler 2001). The coding scheme covered the main elements of
PPNs including their process, structure, goals and objectives, ac-
tions, evidence-based planning, and funding. The PPNs were exam-
ined along seven ‘dimensions’: objectives, multi-sector integration,
contextual data, evidence-based planning, resource mobilization,
feasibility and creativity. The ‘objectives’ of the PPNs were assessed
using SMART criteria to determine whether they were specific,
measurable, attainable, realistic and time-based.
Several strategies were used to ensure the reliability and validity
of the analysis. Researchers involved in the coding scheme had been
working closely in Vietnam so that all meanings of rating and cat-
egorizations were clarified. Two researchers independently applied
the coding to ensure reliability. The themes of the coding scheme
were validated by independent researchers and government officers
responsible for reviewing PPN annually.
Tracking of A&T involvement
Events and activities undertaken by A&T over time were compiled
into an events database, using A&T documents and reports to sum-
marize activities into a template in Excel. The template, which con-
tained information about policy and advocacy events or strategies,
was documented monthly for each year. For this study, activities
and strategies relating to the provincial level were extracted from
the database and summarized.
Results
Changes in content of plans
Content of PPNs was assessed each year from 2010 to 2014 in each
of the 15 provinces targeted by A&T. Marked improvements were
seen over time in some elements of the plans, but stagnation in
others. For the overall assessment assigned to the content of PPNs
from 2010 to 2014, more plans were rated ‘good’ or ‘acceptable’
over time, though fewer were rated ‘good’ in 2014 than the previous
year (Figure 1). There was only one province with a ‘poor’ overall
assessment in 2014 compared to four in 2010. In general, the overall
quality of the PPNs improved over time.
Provincial ‘nutrition data’ came from two main sources. One
was an annual national surveillance survey on nutrition, collected
by provincial Center for Preventive Medicine (CPM) under the tech-
nical support and supervision of NIN. The other was data bi-
annually collected by the Center for Reproductive Health (CRH) on
children’s weight and height (referred as ‘local data’). These two
datasets did not always match on prevalence estimates, and there
lacked consensus as to which dataset represented the actual situation
in the provinces. Moreover, the final national survey data was made
available six or nine months after the deadline for submitting the
PPN. Consequently, provinces were not able to use the most up-to-
date data but instead used the national data from the previous year.
Despite these issues, the concept of SMART objectives was intro-
duced for provincial planning, and some provinces used local data
in the formulation of their plans; which data set to use appears to
have been up to individual planners.
There were data discrepancies between the province and the
Institute [NIN] sources, and the PCs [People’s Committee] are
often unsatisfied when the Institute announced the malnutrition
rates when the province reported a different rate based on 6
months and 1 year data with a larger sample. (respondent from
Provincial Health Service PHS)
In terms of annual ‘nutrition objectives’, the NIN provided guid-
ance in setting targets for undernutrition and IYCF outcomes based
on actual conditions of each province shown by the data, but every
year the central government still assigned targets for all provinces,
which were often not aligned to local realities, making it difficult for
the provinces to achieve. For instance, it was reported by one re-
spondent that PPN objectives can only be finalized once the budget
needed to support the requisite activities is confirmed, but the
budget is confirmed after the due date of the PPN plans; similarly
another respondent reported that objectives have to be in line with
national targets, even if the actual situation in a particular province
for a particular issue is strikingly different to the national average.
This muddled the planning process, as the evidence-based targets
were often superseded by politically motivated national dictates,
and funding often did not follow activities, so plans had to be
revised accordingly.
Guidance on identifying ‘strategic solutions’ according to
local data and objectives was provided by central government.
Five strategic solutions are given for the provinces to select, including
reduction of stunting, underweight, low birth weight and obesity.
Provinces then had flexibility in listing activities under these to make
them locally appropriate. Regardless of the current prevalence in the
province, almost all provinces set objectives to reduce underweight
and stunting. Regarding setting ‘good’ objectives according to
SMART criteria from 2010 to 2014, there was an increase in the
number of provinces over time, from five provinces in 2010 to all 14
available plans in 2013 and 2014 (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Overall assessment of PPNs from 2010 to 2014
Figure 2. Number of provinces with objectives rated as ‘good’ according to
SMART criteria from 2010 to 2014
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IYCF is a key component of good nutrition, and a major focus of
A&T. The number of provinces that ‘incorporated IYCF indicators’
as a strategy for monitoring achievements of their nutrition object-
ives showed an inconsistent trend over time (Figure 3). Five prov-
inces never used IYCF indicators during the 5-year period, two
provinces showed a negative change, and the remaining seven prov-
inces did not have a consistent pattern (data not shown). The greater
number of provinces using these in 2010–12 was related to the pres-
ence and push from A&T during those years. This raises sustainabil-
ity challenges; however, if the PPN process and outcomes are driven
so strongly by external entities.
To effectively reduce malnutrition, ‘actions from multiple sec-
tors’ are required. Since 2010 inter-agency involvement and collab-
oration have reportedly improved; the PHS now plays active role in
mobilizing interagency cooperation with other sectors and organiza-
tions, and strengthening cooperation and partnership is one major
group of solutions included in every province’s PPN. The number of
PPNs that involved multiple sectors increased from 2010 (Figure 4),
but in some cases ‘involvement’ included only the invitation of the
partner to implement pre-specified activities, rather than active par-
ticipation in the planning process. Most organizations outside the
health sector reportedly considered malnutrition prevention the re-
sponsibility of the health sector and assumed the health sector re-
ceives enough resources and support to do the job. In some
provinces, there was still lack of consensus between the health sector
and other sectors in identifying appropriate interventions or solu-
tions to addressing the issues. While horizontal coordination be-
tween sectors improved in some provinces, in others there remained
lack of communication between the three centers that were involved
in doing the planning (CRH, CPM and National Centre for Health
Communication and Education (CHCE)), or with other health
organizations.
In the past, under leadership of PHS, CRH and the CPM under
PEMC were the only two implementing agencies involved in the
development and implementation of PPN. Since 2011, PHS has
invited other agencies to participate in our program planning
process. (respondent from CRH)
The implementation of the activities involves the participa-
tion of different organizations, especially at lower levels.
These organizations are not involved in the planning process
but during the plan implementation. For example, in order
to have a lot of children come for Vitamin A, we have to
ask for support from the village healthcare workers, volun-
teers, staff of the women union, and others. (respondent from
CPM)
Issues affecting change
Both the ‘guidelines’ governing what goes into a plan and the ‘pro-
cess’ of planning and review are important for provincial planning
for nutrition. Support from A&T over the 4 years at both central
and local level was recognized by local actors.
A&T has provided strong support in planning. They provide
technical information, training on planning method, and finan-
cial support to conduct provincial workshop on PPN and carry
out some communication and advocacy activities on nutrition.
A&T’s support in the past 4 years is very important. (respondent
from CRH)
Before 2010, NIN fixed the funding level, the list of activities,
and the amount that provinces could use for each of the listed activ-
ities; plan preparation was limited to copy-and-paste of the contents
from NIN’s template and plugging in guesses of prevalence numbers
and assumptions from the staff in charge of planning. Based on the
NIN guidelines, the PHS simply assigned targets to subordinate and
implementing organizations, which reportedly caused difficulties for
the provinces during implementation as the plans were not based on
local context, needs, or resources.
We basically used our subjective assumptions. In other words,
how we feel we should build our plan for this year. Everything is
based on our feeling, including any ideas for adding or removing
activities into or from the plan. . . Generally, we need to ensure
that our plan meets our leadership’s direction, but it has to be
facilitating enough for us to ensure a feasible implementation
(respondent from CHEC)
. . .the previous guidelines were very general and lack of consider-
ation of the specific situation in different geographic regions.
Every province was asked to do the same thing, achieve the same
objectives and planned targets. In addition the budget lines were
fixed and basically the provinces were not allowed to make any
changes (respondent from PHS)
After findings that the existing PPN ‘guidelines’ were overly-
complex, work by A&T and others with central government and
NIN resulted in streamlined PPN guidelines (Figure 5) to provide
clarity on how plans should be formed, which focused on evidence-
and data-based planning. The new guidelines, issued by the NIN in
2012, were reported to be more specific and realistic while still
allowing some flexibility for the provinces in developing and imple-
menting their plan.
The strong feature is that the guidelines provide details on how
to develop the general and the specific objectives as well as solu-
tions and planned targets for achieving the objectives. While it
helps provinces develop a very comprehensive plan with all these
Figure 3. Number of provinces that include IYCF indicators to monitor nutri-
tion objectives
Figure 4. Number of provinces with multisectoral integration from 2010 to
2014
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elements. . . the feasibility of the plan is decided by the available
resources from the government, including central and local gov-
ernment and the collaboration among different sectors (respond-
ent from CPM)
Following the guidelines, however, was still reported to be a
challenge. The guidelines were said to be not detailed enough, guid-
ance on cost norms and pay rates were unreasonable, and they did
not create room for creativity. It was a challenge for some provinces
to follow the guidance due to differences between national and local
priorities and objectives. Also cited was a lack of vertical coordin-
ation between institutions involved in the province and the NIN at
central level, and a lack of consensus between the PHS and the plan
review and approval authorities in deciding on appropriate solutions
and or activities to address the local issues. For example, while the
PHS saw the need to train and support community collaborators,
other authorities argued that the resources could be used to purchase
nutritional products to support underweight and stunted children.
One of the constraints in following the national directions is lack
of flexibility in implementing the activity. For example, the na-
tional planned target is to have a radio broadcast episode in each
of the commune on monthly basis. . . For big communes, having
only 1 session on monthly basis does not make any sense but we
still have to follow this direction. (respondent from CHEC)
The ‘process’ of provincial planning was identified in baseline re-
search as too complex and top-down, and therefore an impediment
to effective decentralized planning. The planning process includes a
workshop conducted by NIN to discuss the guidelines for PPN and
nationally assigned targets, solutions, and funding levels for each of
the provinces; drafting of the plan by the three primary stakeholders
in each province (CRH, CHEC and CPM) based on the role, func-
tion and scope of work of each center; and plan review and approval
by several national bodies, including a decision on allocating re-
sources for implementation and incorporating the plan into the pro-
vincial socioeconomic development plan.
Although decentralization was said to be important and the PPN
guidelines emphasized context in the content of the plans, the plan-
ning process itself appears to have changed little over time, with
planning still seen as a top-down exercise focused on allocating fi-
nancial resources. The review and approval process was reported to
be too long, with reviewers only paying attention to the general
guidance rather than considering the actual situation of the prov-
ince. There is, therefore, reportedly, a mismatch between the plan-
ning process and the content of the plans set in the guidance.
I have not seen any changes in how the plan is developed in the
past 4 years. It is developed based on the objectives and planned
targets set by the National Institute of Nutrition. There have
been no changes in the way we do our planning. If there are any
changes to the NIN’s plan then we make changes to our plan ac-
cordingly (respondent from CHEC)
‘Leadership’ and staff ‘capacity’ were commonly reported con-
straints. The leadership role of the PHS in provincial planning on
nutrition has not always been clear and decisive. The PHS did not
seem to have a well-defined strategy for nutrition programs, and its
activities were apparently limited to reviewing and combining the
contents of the plans submitted by the three centers (CRH, CPM
and CHEC). Although staff knowledge and ability improved over
time, there was insufficient staff and the staff in place did not have
sufficient planning capacity. Due to these constraints, local planning
staff became dependent on the national guidelines, stifling creativity
or local relevance. Similarly, plan reviewing activities in the
Provinces were limited to ensuring compliance with legal documents
(guidance and regulations) rather than conducting a real needs as-
sessment to identify what could be done better to support the imple-
mentation of the PPN.
They [staff] know how to define the local objectives as compared
to the national objectives based on local conditions, including
human resource, funding, geographic coverage, etc. They know
how to do the review of available budget and resources, includ-
ing funding from national target programs, from local govern-
ment and from projects supported by NGO (respondent from
CHEC)
Yet, we have more issues with planning at district level. This is
because there is no full time staff in charge of PPN planning and
implementation at district level. Staff turnover makes it difficult
for our training to be effective. We find it challenging in provid-
ing guidance on program planning to staff at district level.
Though we have provided due guidance, reporting [back to
Province] seems to be a pending issue (respondent from CRH)
To implement plans, ‘resource mobilization’ needs to be ad-
equate. Funds for implementing, the PPN comes from the national
government as the primary source, and from the local government
and potentially other local sources (NGOs and business) as supple-
mentary. Both total funds from all sources and central funding as a
proportion of total funds have declined for nutrition in all provinces
except one (of 12 with data available) since 2010, and the approved
budget for implementing the PPN was usually (though not always)
lower than the budget level needed. National funding is generally
tied to pre-defined activities, and so does not always match with
decentralized plans even after efforts to improve decentralized plan-
ning for nutrition, and this mismatch remains a major constraint to
setting context-specific targets and activities. In the past three years,
the national budget for nutrition has been decreased by 40–80%
while the objectives and planned targets in NIN’s guidelines were
usually not adjusted; similarly, although improvement of nutrition
status was included in the provincial socioeconomic development
agenda, the local government’s investments in nutrition activities
were insufficient in most provinces. Some provinces were collecting
(or considering) a fee for using the nutrition and IYCF counseling
services at healthcare facilities, which could potentially limit access,
and others had had to set priorities and identify core activities.
Planning and budgeting was generally an iterative process, with
Figure 5. New PPN guidelines developed in 2011
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plans being written according to need, then revised according to
available resources and national requirements. A&T support in
mobilizing funds from local stakeholders was reported as useful by
some respondents, but is not a sustainable solution.
The challenge in doing the planning is that we can only finalize
the plan when information on approved budget is available. We
never know about the certainty of funding for individual activity
for the next year in order to do appropriate planning. For ex-
ample for we include in our plan a training activity but the fund-
ing for training might not be available in the approved budget.
Likewise the approved funding for the nutrition survey might not
match the proposed funding for the activity then we have to do
lots of revisions to the final plan. (respondent from CPM)
Summary
Despite this mixed picture from analysis of the content of PPNs and
the process of making them, two-thirds of stakeholders reported
that the plans had improved. This was partly attributed to A&T
workshops and training, which improved capacity and availability
of data. Respondents did cite, however, significant limitations in
applying new learning and systems from remnants of centralized
planning processes; if activities or targets outside of the annual na-
tional nutrition plans and multi-year national plans of action on nu-
trition were included, the PPN was usually rejected by the PHS or
other authorities and was redone. In addition, there was conflict be-
tween documents and regulations issued by the central government.
A&T did work with national government to develop guidance for
the PPN process, but these were still constrained by centrally
planned national priorities and targets on which A&T had no input.
The A&T training is very comprehensive and in-depth. I was
able to develop more understanding about some technical issues
but also on planning process. Their training is very useful. The
training is very good and very practical. Unfortunately it is not
applicable in reality. We still have to follow the national frame-
work in doing the planning. (respondent from CPM)
If we develop the plan based on our actual needs and independ-
ently from the availability of the national and local funding, our
proposed budget would never be approved. This also makes our
annual planning process just a formality. . .If it was not following
the guidelines, the PPN would not get approved by either the
PHS or other authorities such as the People’s Committee or the
DoF [Department of Finance]. It would be very difficult to get it
approved. (respondent from CHEC)
In terms of policy or legal environment, there are some challenges
encountered during the implementation. For example, the plan
might have been developed based on guidance from a circular or
an ordinance but later on an official document was sent out say-
ing that the circular or the ordinance was no longer applicable.
This creates confusions for the planning staff. . . There are over-
lapping and also conflicts between different policies. (respondent
from PHS)
I think if changes are made to the PPN process, it must start with
the NIN. The NIN should provide more specific guidance for the
planning, including what activities are prioritized and for what
target groups. This is because the PPN is based on the national
guidance or guidelines from the NIN and must fit in the National
Nutrition Strategy. It is also important to provide direction on
funding allocation for implementing the national strategy or ac-
tion plan. (respondent from CPM)
This assessment of changes in Provincial Planning for Nutrition
has uncovered important evidence on the use of data, clear
objectives, strategic solutions and IYCF indicators in plans; assessed
multi-sector action, leadership, and capacity in the process of bring-
ing plans together; considered the roles of revised guidelines, re-
sources, and the regulatory environment in creating and
implementing plans; and reflected on the role of A&T in changes
that occurred. Although the picture is complex and results therefore
mixed, we are able to draw some lessons going forward.
Discussion
Research undertaken before the A&T program began in 2009 called
for stronger engagement of provinces in nutrition planning, as these
are the center of decision making and resource allocation under the
partial decentralization of the health sector in Vietnam (Lapping
et al. 2014). This 2014 paper noted several potential constraints to
this action—including continued centralized control, and limited re-
sources, data, capacity and collaboration—which A&T explicitly
set out to address.
Our evaluation of the PPN process, drawing on stakeholder
interviews in 2010 and 2014 and annual PPN content analysis high-
lights improvements in the quality of nutrition plans but also signifi-
cant continued planning challenges. The number of provinces with
broadly adequate or good nutrition plans rose over time, and some
elements in the plans grew stronger. Local planning skills improved,
but capacity remained insufficient. Awareness of and support for
nutrition improved, but some policy and legal environments were
contradictory. Objectives were clearer, but use of data for planning
remained inconsistent. Provinces became more proactive and cre-
ative, but remained constrained by slow central approval processes
and insufficient funding. This suggests that improvements occurred,
particularly at the provincial level where A&T work was focused,
but also suggests that there are continued challenges, particularly
from the national level where more work might be done to relieve
constraints on planning. The broader politics, however, will likely
remain a limiting issue.
The contents of PPNs improved between 2010 and 2014. Some
provinces applied local nutrition data to the development of their
PPNs, but a similar number of provinces did not; the facilitating role
played by A&T in making available local data was helpful, but un-
less this role is institutionalized for the long term, it is not a sustain-
able solution. Although nutrition objectives were well-stated by
most provinces, these continued to be influenced by central-level re-
quirements. Involving other sectors in a meaningful way presents a
real challenge; planners may recognize the importance of involving
sectors other than health, but often stop at mentioning the sectors in
the plan without any details about their exact involvement. Lack of
consensus and collaboration among concerned organizations, and
absence of some critical topics in the PPN guidelines, continued to
be reported as major challenges.
Issues with the process of decentralized planning hampered these
efforts. Capacity was cited as a major constraint by respondents; al-
though capacity improved, there remained lack of confidence for
undertaking the planning process. This is echoed in other assess-
ments of public service decentralization in Vietnam (Wit 2007),
where it was found that three quarters of local staff members do not
have proper training for their role, and elsewhere (Azfar et al.
1999). This lack of capacity throughout the Vietnamese health sys-
tem has been attributed to disruption dating back to economic re-
forms in the 1980s, which undermined funding for training and
health service use (Lieberman et al. 2005). Even with improved
guidelines then, it could take more years of capacity development
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and support to improve planning processes in a sustained manner,
even if central institutions ease their influence over planning.
Administrative decentralization is advanced in Vietnam, but for
public services other than nutrition it has been noted that, while tasks
and funds have been allocated to provinces, power and decision-
making has remained centralized (Lieberman et al. 2005; Wit 2007).
The same appears to be true for nutrition; while the rationale and
plan for decentralized nutrition planning is sound, the central level
needs to catch up with the provinces. The main proposed advantages
of decentralization will not be achieved consistently or in a meaning-
ful way if decentralized nutrition planning remains constrained by
relatively inflexible centralized planning processes.
Fiscal decentralization has been applied sporadically and by de-
fault in the PPN process, with funds still tied to national objectives ra-
ther than decentralized ones. For many years, provinces have been
dependent on the availability of national funding, but central govern-
ment has been withdrawing funds over time. Furthermore, after 2015
this national funding was cut by 65% due to reductions in donor
funds stemming from to Vietnam’s graduation to ‘middle-income
country’ status in 2008; if national government does not see nutrition
as a priority in this new funding situation, provinces will become
more challenged by the lack of resources necessary for the implemen-
tation of the PPN. On the one hand, this might be seen as an oppor-
tunity for provinces to make better efforts in mobilizing resources
from different sources and having more autonomy in planning, if the
review and approval process allows this. On the other, it has been sug-
gested in other Asian contexts that decentralized nutrition program-
ming can suffer from reduced economies of scale (Friedman et al.
2006). A&T’s support in resource mobilization played an important
part in helping provinces think ahead about the sustainability of PPN,
but this should be within a broader debate about fiscal decentraliza-
tion in Vietnam, and whether it would truly be allowed in practice.
The major narrative coming from this research is that, despite
positive work to support planning systems and raise awareness and
capacity, critical constraints remain at provincial level—many of
which are outside the control of external projects trying to bring
change, at least in the short term, and all of which chime with the
few prior studies of nutrition decentralization in Asia in general
(Friedman et al. 2006) and health system decentralization in
Vietnam in particular (Lieberman et al. 2005). What changes there
have been at provincial level have been constrained primarily by the
maintenance of top-down centralized planning, budgeting, and re-
view processes, which inhibit the contextualization of provincial
plans and creativity in local programming. Vietnam’s decentraliza-
tion more broadly has been found to be constrained by a lack of in-
centives for bureaucratic actors to transfer power and resources to
local levels, and ill-defined boundaries between functions controlled
by central-level managers and those controlled by their field level
counterparts (Omar 2002). If incentives and boundaries cannot be
defined and acted upon, all of the local-level capacity building and
formulating of clear and rational goals that were supported by A&T
likely will not be able to achieve long-term and comprehensive
decentralized nutrition planning. In other contexts, what works best
is often a practical hybrid of authoritative (often central) coordin-
ation, local problem solving, and borrowing from local ways of
working in particular contexts (Crook and Booth 2011), with the
role of the center more one of redistributing resources and providing
technical assistance (Fritzen 2006). This may be a useful solution for
moving provincial nutrition planning in Vietnam forward given the
preferences currently for maintenance of centralized power and
given the existing nutrition situation in Vietnam. Although the nutri-
tion situation has improved substantially over recent years in
Vietnam, future improvements in nutrition will require targeted at-
tention to behaviors in sub-groups that must be tailored to local con-
texts to be effective, given the substantial ethnic, socioeconomic,
and ecological diversity in the country. Working even this hybrid so-
lution; however, will require greater clarity on boundaries and roles
of actors at different levels; previous work has also found that, in
addition to improved technical ability, local administrators require
clear information on expectations for the decentralization process it-
self (Azfar et al. 2001; Wit 2007).
This study is one of few globally that has followed the process of
decentralization of nutrition planning which is occurring in many
different contexts, and attempted to understand and improve the
process. Although this research has some important results which
resonate with other published literature on nutrition and health sys-
tem decentralization in Vietnam, the study has some limitations.
Most importantly, the design of the project did not allow us to com-
pare findings in the A&T Provinces with other, unsupported
Provinces, and we do not therefore have a counterfactual to assess
what was happening in the absence of the program. We have pro-
vided, however, a detailed assessment of change in those Provinces
with A&T support. Second, we may not have covered all possible
respondents and therefore all possible viewpoints. Through having a
team based in Vietnam for the duration of the project; however, we
had a good overview of those at national and provincial level who
were involved in the PPN process, and are confident that the most
important viewpoints have been captured. Finally, the complex and
multi-faceted nature of the plans, the process, and the context neces-
sitated some simplification and ordering in order to undertake this
assessment; we believe that the trade-off between synthesis and com-
plexity was balanced in our study.
In conclusion, targeted assistance and local advocacy can im-
prove some components of decentralized planning for nutrition,
with success dependent on the overall policy and programming con-
text and ability to overcome constraints around capacity, invest-
ment, and remnants of highly centralized planning. We recommend
strong engagement with planners at the national level to understand
how to unblock major constraints; solutions must take into consid-
eration the particular political, financial and administrative context.
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Note
1. Note that not all 15 provinces provided a full plan in each
year, hence numbers not adding up to 15 in all years.
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